FIFA World Cup 2006 in Germany: enhanced surveillance improved timeliness and detection by Williams, Christopher J. et al.
FIFA World Cup 2006 in Germany: enhanced surveillance
improved timeliness and detection
C. J. WILLIAMS 1,2*, K. SCHENKEL 1, T. ECKMANNS1, D. ALTMANN1
AND G. KRAUSE 1
1 Department for Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Robert Koch Institute, Berlin, Germany
2 European Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (EPIET), European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
(Accepted 28 June 2008; first published online 31 July 2008)
SUMMARY
Enhanced surveillance for infectious disease events, with accelerated routine reporting and daily
supplementary reports, was undertaken during the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany. We
evaluated the surveillance outputs, reporting intervals and detection of World Cup-relevant
events for the enhanced system. Outbreak numbers for measles, Norovirus and Campylobacter
were significantly higher than in previous years, but all increases were explained by prior trends.
The median interval (disease onset to receipt at national centre) fell from 17 days in 2005 to 12
days in 2006. Detection of World Cup-relevant events was 44% (8/18) in the routine system and
77% (14/18) in supplementary reports. We did not identify any significant effect on infectious
disease epidemiology relating to the FIFA 2006 World Cup. Daily reporting improved timeliness,
and supplementary reporting improved relevant event detection. Enhancing existing systems,
without the addition of syndromic surveillance, can be an effective approach to mass-event
surveillance.
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INTRODUCTION
World Cup 2006
The 2006 FIFA (Fédération International de Football
Association) World Cup was held in Germany be-
tween 9 June and 9 July 2006. Sixty-four matches were
held in 12 cities from nine German states, with around
3 million stadium tickets sold [1]. Based on these ticket
sales around 1 million foreign visitors were antici-
pated. Around 21 million people were estimated to
have attended the official fan festivals, where games
were shown on large screens, with 9 million in Berlin
alone [2]. Additional foreign visitors not carrying
tickets, and visitors fromother parts ofGermany, were
also expected, and visitors and residents gathered to
watch matches in bars and cafes.
Event surveillance
At any event where people gather, there is the potential
for both non-infectious health hazards including in-
jury [3], exacerbations of pre-existing disease [4], and
heat-related illness [5] ; and infectious disease events.
Infectious disease transmission may be promoted
by an increase in population density, importation of
unusual pathogens, strains on infrastructure, and
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changes in services (such as food stalls) or behaviour
(increased demand for sex workers). Large events are
also potential targets for bioterrorism [6].
There have been some reports of infectious disease
outbreaks at mass events. Syndromic surveillance at
an outdoor camping event in the United States ident-
ified outbreaks of gastroenteritis [5]. A cluster of me-
ningococcal meningitis cases in the United Kingdom
were linked to attendance at a rugby match [7], and
meningitis outbreaks have been linked to the annual
pilgrimage to Mecca (the Hajj) [8].
In view of this background, the Robert Koch
Institute (RKI) in Berlin (national communicable
disease institute) decided to institute enhanced sur-
veillance but not additional syndromic surveillance.
The main reasons for the provision of enhanced
surveillance were the perceived increased risk of
infectious disease events and the need to detect and
respond to such events quickly due to their short-lived
nature.
We analysed the results of the enhanced surveil-
lance in order to determine whether that the FIFA
2006 World Cup had had an effect on infectious
disease epidemiology in Germany, and evaluated the
enhanced system itself in order to assess its added
value in such mass events.
METHODS
Enhanced surveillance activities
Germany already has an electronic reporting system
for infectious diseases, SurvNet, whose design and
characteristics have been recently described [9]. Rather
than creating a new system for the event, it was decided
to strengthen and augment the existing surveillance
structures.
The enhanced surveillance measures were under-
taken in the local and state health departments
responsible for the 12 cities hosting tournament
matches (World Cup cities : Berlin, Cologne, Dort-
mund, Frankfurt, Gelsenkirchen, Hamburg, Hann-
over, Kaiserslautern, Leipzig, Munich, Nuremberg,
Stuttgart), during the period 7 June to 11 July 2006.
The 2 days of surveillance immediately before the
match was designed to provide a short run-in period
for the system, and the 2 days following the finalmatch
to allow capture of the commonest, short-incubation
period gastrointestinal infections.
There were four main enhancements to infectious
disease surveillance during the FIFA 2006 World
Cup: accelerated transmission of notifiable disease
case-data (from weekly to daily) ; marking cases of
relevance to the FIFA 2006 World Cup in routine
notifications (SurvNet) ; daily supplementary reports
from all cities hosting matches; and the National
Enhanced Surveillance Operations Centre (NESOC),
staffed Monday to Saturday, in the national epi-
demiology centre (RKI) which collected, analysed
and reported on daily surveillance inputs. Daily sup-
plementary reports were structured using four head-
ings : disease outbreaks ; unusual individual cases of
notifiable diseases; other unusual individual cases ;
and any other unusual events. These were reported
briefly in Word format on a daily basis and were in-
tended as a supplementary instrument to promptly
capture events that would not fulfil the case definition
of the routine reporting system.
Communication with local and state health de-
partments was facilitated by teleconferences, email
and telephone communications, and pre-World Cup
training sessions. A commercial text search for 14
infection-related keywords including ‘bacteria’, ‘epi-
demic’ and ‘ infection’, of 25 German newspapers
was used to screen for relevant press reports. Further
details of this enhanced surveillance were published in
2006 [10].
Data from routine reporting system (SurvNet)
All SurvNet data extracted (but not the routine sur-
veillance itself) were restricted to the 47 pathogens or
diseases notifiable through local health departments,
and to the World Cup cities listed above, apart from
where otherwise specified. Pathogens or diseases di-
rectly notifiable to the RKI (bypassing local health
departments) were excluded from the evaluation (but
not surveillance activities) as we were concerned with
the interactions between the local health departments
in the World Cup cities and the RKI surveillance ac-
tivities.
SurvNet is a working surveillance system and data
is constantly updated and revised; therefore data ex-
tractions can specify the time point at which they are
valid. All SurvNet data used was valid as of 1 August
2006 (3 weeks after the tournament period) except for
2007 outbreak data, which was valid at 1 August
2007. All time comparisons used SurvNet data from
weeks 23 to 29 inclusive, a 7-week period from 5 June
(4 days before the first match) to 23 July 2006 (2 weeks
after the last match), in order to capture earlier or
later notified cases.
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Numbers of notified cases and outbreaks reported
to SurvNet
We extracted data on SurvNet case notifications from
2001 to 2006, and also on outbreaks notified to Surv-
Net from 2001 to 2007. Data obtained included fulfil-
ment of RKI reference definitions, year of reporting,
and organism. The populations of the 12 World Cup
cities were obtained from theGerman Statistical Office
[11]. For pathogens or diseases with three or more
outbreaks in 2006 we calculated Poisson confidence
intervals for the years 2001 to 2005 using Intercooled
Stata, version 9 (StataCorp, College Station TX,
USA), and compared these with the figures for 2006.
Comparison of reported disease burden with
expected burden
In order to estimate the number of additional cases of
selected infections that might result from the increase
in tourism, we calculated the background incidence of
Campylobacter, Salmonella and Norovirus per person
day, for weeks 23–29 in the 12 cities hosting matches,
based on 2001–2005 figures (2005 only for Norovirus
due to a rising secular trend).
These pathogen-specific incidences were multiplied
by the estimated additional overseas overnight visi-
tors to Germany during the World Cup, obtained
from a report published by the German tourism office
[12], cross-referenced with a report from the German
Statistical Office [13].
Detection of WM-relevant events
We extracted case-data for all notifications to
SurvNet marked as ‘WM-2006’ in the free text of the
form, including those from local health departments
outside the World Cup cities listed above. All events
from the daily status reports were entered into a
spreadsheet, classified by columns including organ-
ism, number of cases, health department and sup-
plementary description. It should be noted that
reporting offices were not given a strict definition of
cases which should be reported in the supplementary
system.
An event was defined as the first report of one or
more linked cases in the routine (SurvNet) or sup-
plementary reporting systems. A FIFA 2006 World
Cup-marked event was defined as one which con-
tained the marker ‘WM-2006’ in the SurvNet system,
or (in the supplementary reports) as any event which
mentioned the World Cup, a FIFA 2006 World Cup
team or any other event linked to the FIFA 2006
World Cup in the text. A foreign visitor-related event
or case was defined as any FIFA 2006 World Cup-
marked case in SurvNet in a foreign national, or as
any event in the supplementary daily report where
foreign nationality was recorded.
A FIFA 2006 World Cup-relevant event (or case)
was defined as any event (or case) which was either
FIFA 2006 World Cup-marked or foreign visitor-
related. Using inclusion in either source as the ‘gold
standard’, we estimated the detection of these FIFA
2006 World Cup-relevant events by each system
(supplementary reports and SurvNet).
Timeliness and data quality
We extracted the dates of disease onset, diagnosis,
notification, receipt at local health department, and
receipt at RKI on cases reported to SurvNet subject
to the above restrictions. Three time intervals were
calculated using Stata : disease onset to receipt at
RKI; diagnosis to notification; and entry in local
health department to receipt at RKI. We excluded
observations with intervals exceeding 365 days (onset
to RKI receipt) or 100 days (latter two intervals).
We compared the mean, median and 10th and 90th
percentiles for each interval in 2006 and 2005, using
the Mann–Whitney test for the statistical significance
of differences.
The percentage of notified cases fulfilling the most
specific of the RKI reference definitions was used as
an estimator of data quality, with data from 2005 as
the comparator.
We looked for and documented examples of
reporting delay by comparing daily supplementary
reports, SurvNet data, press reports collated during
the FIFA 2006 World Cup period, and feedback from
the RKI surveillance team.
Comparison of reporting to supplementary and
routine (SurvNet) systems
The proportion of cases notified to SurvNet from
which were included in daily supplementary reports
was calculated for each notifiable organism.
Additional resources used at local and national level
A web-based questionnaire survey of the 12 local
health departments covering the 12 FIFA 2006 World
Cup cities was conducted just after the 1-week test
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period for the enhanced surveillance. Health depart-
ments were asked how long they had spent per day
on researching cases and on data transmission and
supplementary reports. They were also asked about
additional staff recruited and additional resources
provided.
We used the mid-point of each time category
(e.g. 90 min for the 1–2 h category) to calculate sum-
mary statistics. RKI staff resources were calculated
using the daily surveillance team roster.
RESULTS
Numbers of notified cases and outbreaks reported
to SurvNet
There were 4112 (3793 fulfilling reference definitions)
cases notified to the routine surveillance system
SurvNet from the 12 match-hosting cities between
weeks 23 and 29, fewer than the 5083 (4889 ful-
filling reference definitions) from the same period in
2005.
The commonest outbreak-causing organisms (>2
outbreaks in 2006) in weeks 23–29 of 2005 and 2006
were Salmonella, Campylobacter, Norovirus, Rota-
virus, Giardia and measles. During the FIFA 2006
World Cup period, Campylobacter, Norovirus and
measles outbreak numbers exceeded the upper Poisson
confidence interval for the same cities and period dur-
ing 2001–2005.
Figure 1 shows the number of outbreaks caused
by these three organisms in the same period in
years 2001–2007. The increase in Norovirus and
Campylobacter outbreaks is consistent with an in-
creasing secular trend, the latter decreasing after 2005.
Only for measles is the increased number of outbreaks
(four) not part of a broader trend.
Expected cases in foreign visitors
Non-German nationals accounted for an estimated
two million additional overnight stays during the
FIFA 2006 World Cup period.
This population time would be expected to give rise
to an additional six Campylobacter, five Salmonella
and two Norovirus cases (Table 1).
Actual reports of Salmonella, Campylobacter and
Norovirus in foreign nationals amounted to two
Campylobacter cases (one from SurvNet, one ad-
ditionally from supplementary reports), six Norovirus
cases (SurvNet) and three Salmonella cases (SurvNet).
Detection of FIFA 2006 World Cup-relevant events
in supplementary reports and SurvNet
There were 155 events in the supplementary reports.
The commonest causative organisms (at least four
reported events) were measles, scarlet fever, chicken-
pox, hand foot and mouth disease, erythema in-
fectiosum, legionellosis, Norovirus, gastroenteritis,
pertussis and Salmonella.
Seventy-one FIFA 2006 World Cup-marked cases
from eight events were reported to SurvNet, of
which 63 were Norovirus cases related to the Munich
broadcasting company outbreak. The remaining
eight comprised four Salmonella and four Campylo-
bacter cases (two of the latter being part of the same
event).
Including the Munich Norovirus outbreak, 14
FIFA 2006 World Cup-marked events (77 cases) were
notified via either the daily supplementary reports or
the SurvNet system. Four were reported to SurvNet
but not in supplementary reports: all were from
health departments not participating in the enhanced
surveillance. Six were reported in the supplementary
report but not in SurvNet, of which four involved
non-German nationals, and two were non-notifiable,
non-infectious hazards (pollen allergy and a hail-
storm).
There were 11 events (30 cases) reported in non-
German nationals : nine single cases, and two out-
breaks involving foreign visitors (total 21 cases).
These included cases of chickenpox, malaria,
Legionella, gastroenteritis and one case of mumps. No
cases of measles in non-German nationals were re-
ported to either system.
A total of 18 events from SurvNet and the sup-













































Fig. 1. Number of reported outbreaks due to selected dis-
eases, 2001–2007, weeks 23–29 in World Cup cities.
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World Cup-relevant (i.e. either FIFA 2006 World
Cup-marked or foreign visitor-related). The detection
of FIFA 2006 World Cup-relevant events was 44%
(8/18) in SurvNet and 78% (14/18) in the sup-
plementary reports.
Timeliness and data quality
We used 5901/6213 cases for diagnosis to notification
calculations; 8492/8492 for entry in local health de-
partment to receipt at RKI; and 5512/5524 for disease
onset to receipt at RKI. Table 2 shows the summary
statistics for the three time intervals.
All time intervals were lower in 2006 compared to
2005. Overall time from disease onset to receipt at
RKI fell from a median of 17 days to a median of 12
days (2006). The reductions were significant for all
three time periods (Mann–Whitney test, P<0.01).
The percentage of cases fitting the reference defi-
nition was significantly lower during the surveillance
period (3127/4112, 76.0%) than in the same period in
2005 (4106/5083, 80.8%) (P<0.001).
Early detection through press scanning
There were several incidents where press reports
identified an issue before it was notified to RKI
through the enhanced surveillance system.
These included a case of meningococcal disease in
Bavaria (not FIFA 2006 World Cup-related) ; gas-
trointestinal illness in the Croatian national football
team (event 2 June 2006, press report 3 June 2006 [14],
in RKI report 9 June 2006); and cases of chickenpox
in a Togo national team player, and in an Indonesian
journalist (press report 30 May 2006, RKI report 8
June 2006). The latter two press reports were ident-
ified through ad-hoc reporting rather than the daily
press screening. Only three of the 26 reports identified
in the German local press by the press screening had
any relation to the 2006 FIFA World Cup.
Table 1. Estimated additional cases in non-German nationals during the




on 2005 figures only)
Mean cases per year in weeks
23–29 (2001–2005)
1718 1379 557
Mean cases per day in weeks
23–29 (2001–2005)
0.30 0.24 0.10
Extra person-days in 2006 2 000 000 2 000 000 2 000 000
Estimated extra cases, 2006 6 5 2
Observed cases (SurvNet and
supplementary reports
2 3 6
Table 2. Time periods between notification steps, World Cup cities, weeks 23–29, 2006 compared to 2005
(SurvNet data, data as of 1 August 2006)





Diagnosis to notification Mean (number of observations) 2.82 (3365) 2.65 (2536)
Median (10th–90th percentile) 2 (0–6) 1 (0–6)
Entry in local health
department to
receipt in RKI
Mean (number of observations) 5.9 (4788) 3.08 (3704)
Median (10th–90th percentile) 3 (1–9) 1 (0–6)
Illness onset to receipt
in RKI
Mean (number of observations) 21.08 (3256) 15.54 (2256)
Median (10th–90th percentile) 17 (9–32) 12 (5–27)
RKI, Robert Koch Institute.
Enhanced surveillance: 2006 World Cup 601
Comparison of reporting to supplementary and
routine (SurvNet) systems
Table 3 compares the number of reports and cases for
a selection of organisms featuring in both SurvNet
notifications and the local health department daily
supplementary reports.
For three organisms (measles, tick-borne encepha-
litis and haemolytic–uraemic syndrome: bold in
Table 3), more cases were reported in daily sup-
plementary reports than in SurvNet. For other or-
ganisms, the proportion of routine cases reported in
supplementary reports varied from 0.2% to 0.6%




The RKI team consisted of two staff, drawn on a ro-
tating basis from the department. The daily shift was
from 09:00 to 15:30 hours (6.5 h) apart from Saturday
(09:00–13:00 hours), 6 days per week, and ran during
the test week prior to the event and then for 5 weeks
during the FIFA 2006 World Cup (7 June 2006 to 11
July 2006). A room was assigned for the duration of
the surveillance, and was supplied with telephones, a
fax machine, laptop computers and a television.
Local health departments
The 13/13 local health departments who answered the
pre-FIFA 2006 World Cup survey required a median
of 30–60 min per day (range <30 min to 2–4 h) for
investigating FIFA 2006 World Cup-relevant cases,
and a further 30–60 min median for data transmission
and daily supplementary report compilation (range
<30 min to 1–2 h) during the test week.
One local health department required additional
staff for the enhanced surveillance. Three out of 13
local health departments required additional non-
personnel resources for the enhanced surveillance
preparation (one <E500, one E500–1000, one
>E1000–5000).
No department received additional funding for the
enhanced surveillance. Suggested uses for additional
resources (had they been provided) included extra
staff and training, preparation of information mate-
rials, improvement of on-call functions, and payment
for overtime and extra duties.
DISCUSSION
During the 2006 FIFA World Cup there was no in-
crease in reported infectious episodes, and the ex-
pected number of additional cases was low. The
increases in the numbers of outbreaks due to
Table 3. Cases reported in local health department daily supplementary reports (7 June 2006 to 11 July 2006)
compared with SurvNet notifications (weeks 23–29, 2006, cases fulfilling reference definition, data as of 1 August











Measles* 32 134 48 279.2%
Hepatitis A 7 8 46 17.4%
Legionella 7 7 16 43.8%
Norovirus 6 72 429 16.8%
Salmonella 4 5 877 0.6%
Tick-borne
encephalitis*
3 7 4 175.0%
Haemolytic uraemic
syndrome*
3 3 2 150.0%
Shigellosis 3 3 17 17.6%
Campylobacter 2 2 1207 0.2%
Meningitis 2 2 5 40.0%
Hantavirus 1 1 2 50.0%
Listeriosis 1 1 8 12.5%
Rotavirus 1 5 255 2.0%
* Organisms or diseases in bold are those where the number of cases in the supplementary reports exceeds those reported to
SurvNet.
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Norovirus, Campylobacter and measles were either
part of a secular trend (Norovirus andCampylobacter)
or due to a large outbreak which predated the 2006
FIFA 2006 World Cup [15] (measles). Enhanced
surveillance improved timeliness and detection of
relevant events, without requiring significant extra
resources.
This absence of evidence of any increase in overall
infectious disease events is consistent with the findings
from other event surveillance reports. At the EURO
2004 football tournament in Portugal, no visitors
were found to be affected by infectious disease out-
breaks, and the number of outbreaks in the local
population did not exceed expected values based on
data from the preceding 3 years [16]. At the Sydney
Olympics in 2000, the number of infectious disease
notifications was in line with the numbers from the
preceding and following years [17]. A similar picture
was reported from surveillance during the millennium
year in Rome [18].
The expected additional numbers of Norovirus,
Campylobacter and Salmonella infections in foreign
visitors were low compared to total notifications of
these organisms during the tournament period (13
expected; 2513 notified). Even if the risk of infection
in foreign visitors was higher than the background
rate, foreign cases would still be greatly outnumbered
by local cases.
The only significant outbreak involving foreign
visitors was the Munich Norovirus outbreak which
involved at least five foreign nationals. The 30 cases
(11 events) in non-German nationals reported
through enhanced surveillance was a small proportion
of the total notifications (0.7% of 4112) in the same
period. A similarly low proportion of notifications in
non-residents (12/1752, 0.7%) was found at the
Sydney Olympics [17]. During the millennium year in
Rome, the numbers of Legionella cases and food-
borne outbreaks in foreign visitors were higher than
expected levels, but the number of visitors (26 million)
and the period of surveillance (1 year) were much
greater than for theWorld Cup and Sydney Olympics.
Supplementary reporting increased detection of
FIFA 2006 World Cup-relevant events, which might
otherwise have gone unremarked in the routine sys-
tem. Apart from the Munich Norovirus outbreak,
very few FIFA 2006 World Cup-marked cases were
reported to SurvNet. However, many cases and events
in the supplementary daily reports, such as cases of
viral diseases in day-care centres for young children,
were not relevant to the event. Thus the increased
sensitivity came at the cost of a reduced positive pre-
dictive value.
The threshold for reporting events in the daily
supplementary reports varied widely and was influ-
enced by topicality. For example, following a Pan-
American Health Organisation (PAHO) warning
about the measles outbreak in Germany, the RKI
raised awareness among participating health depart-
ments of the importance of notifying measles cases.
This accounts for the high number of measles cases in
the supplementary reports.
The move to daily transmission of routine notifi-
cations reduced the total reporting interval by 5 days,
which is significant during an event lasting only 30
days. Faster transmission may account for the small
reduction in data quality, with cases being transmitted
before information gathering is complete. The few
instances where cases were first identified through
mass media justified the daily media screening.
There were several limitations in the evaluation of
the enhanced surveillance. There is no single defi-
nition of a ‘FIFA 2006 World Cup-relevant’ case,
and even if there were, it would be impossible to de-
termine the true number of such events to assess the
sensitivity of any enhanced surveillance. As we had no
strict definition of event relevance, local departments
had the opportunity to report anything they felt to be
significant, with the aim of improving sensitivity for
important events.
The low number of cases reported in non-German
nationals may be due to visitors having poorer access
to health care, or not becoming symptomatic and/or
seeking medical help until their return home. Our
application of background risk when calculating
estimated cases of Norovirus, Campylobacter and
Salmonella in foreign visitors may have been incor-
rect, if risk behaviour were different among visitors
compared to the host population.
Despite the existence of potential drivers of infec-
tious disease transmission during mass events, our
results add to the body of evidence suggesting that
mass events do not increase the burden of infectious
disease in either the host or visitor populations. This
may be because visitors to such events are relatively
affluent, young and healthy and are therefore less
likely to fall ill.
However, enhanced surveillance at such events is
likely to continue as a reassurance for governing
authorities and the public especially in light of the
possibility of bioterrorism attacks during such high-
profile events.
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Syndromic surveillance has been employed at many
recent international mass gatherings, including the
FIFA World Cup in 1998 (France) [19] ; the Olympic
games in 2004 (Athens) [20] and 2000 (Sydney) ; the
Winter Olympics in Turin (2006) [21] and Salt Lake
City (2002) [22] ; and G8 summits in Japan (2000) [23]
and the United Kingdom (2005) [24]. Of the signals
detected by syndromic surveillance at these events,
only two were confirmed as outbreaks or clusters [23,
24] ; no other significant infectious disease events were
identified. In two cases outbreaks of Legionella [19]
and gastrointestinal disease [23] not detected using
syndromic surveillance were identified through the
usual notification system. Thus syndromic surveil-
lance may not always be the best response to infec-
tious disease surveillance at international events.
Syndromic surveillance involves a system additional
to the routine notification system which captures data
on sets of presenting symptoms or syndromes from
other health-care sources such as primary care or
emergency departments, and analyses this separate
dataset to detect signals which may indicate infectious
disease cases or outbreaks. In the absence of a strong
and timely routine notification system, syndromic
surveillance can be extremely useful for mass events.
Syndromic surveillance was not implemented at the
FIFA 2006 World Cup due to the resource demands
of such systems, the strengths of the existing routine
notification system, and the possibility of using the
efforts for the event to improve the routine system. An
additional system would perhaps have diverted re-
sources from the existing one, and required additional
resources to reconcile differing data signals from the
two systems. The existing routine system worked well,
and already allowed the reporting of outbreaks of
particular syndromes before pathogen isolation.
Moreover, enhanced surveillance offered a chance to
trial accelerated routine reporting, which could then
be extended to improve the whole routine system for
the future.
The surveillance evaluation suggests that satisfac-
tory event surveillance can be achieved through minor
temporary adaptations of an existing routine infec-
tious disease surveillance system. Our approach en-
ables good comparability with data from other areas
and time periods, but also means that the extra efforts
required for a mass gathering can be harnessed for
longer-term improvements in routine surveillance.
Potential drivers for increased infectious disease
transmission occur commonly, due to commuting,
seasonal travel and smaller-scale gatherings such as
concerts and conferences. A timely, sensitive and re-
liable surveillance system is therefore invaluable in the
detection of associated problems at all times, not just
during international sporting events.
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